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THE MEDICAL STAFF PRIVILEGES PROBLEM IN
FLORIDA
THOMAS KATHEDER
I. INTRODUCTION
It is now well recognized that a physician's access to a hospital
for the health care of his or her patients is indispensable in view of
the enormously expensive equipment, continually upgraded medi-
cal technology, and professional support staff available in the mod-
ern hospital.1 Medical staff privileges at one or more hospitals or
similar health care facilities are essential to the professional and
economic survival of most physicians, particularly specialists.' In-
deed, one author, a physician-lawyer, remarked that "[a] physician
without privileges is almost certain to become a physician without
patients."'3 Consequently, when staff privileges are denied, termi-
nated, or suspended, physicians fight back with a vengeance by
bringing suits against the hospital, its governing board, and even
their own peers on the hospital's medical staff.' These suits occur
1. For an excellent discussion of the symbiotic relationship between the physician and
the hospital, see Note, Health Professionals' Access to Hospitals: A Retrospective and Pro-
spective Analysis, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1179 (1981).
2. A useful illustration of the specialist's reliance upon access to a well-equipped hospital
is the practice of open heart surgery. See, e.g., Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 855
(W.D. Pa. 1981).
3. Goldsmith, The Present Status of Physician Privileges, 27 MED. TmiAL TECH. Q. 121,
121 (1980).
The physician's dependence on the hospital is apparently not something peculiar to
American health care. See, e.g., Saltsman, Physicians' Staff Privileges in Ontario Hospitals,
8 OrrOWA L. REV. 382, 383-84 (1976) ("[a]ccess to hospital staff appointments is of vital
importance to most physicians"); Comment, Hospital Privileges: Re Macdonald and North
York General Hospital, 35 U. TORONTo FAC. L. Ray. 126, 128 (1977) ("hospital affiliation has
become a professional and economic necessity for the physician").
4. In 1977, the Florida legislature enacted a limited statutory immunity for "peer re-
view" participants, referred to collectively as "medical review committees," a designation
which includes the medical staff of licensed hospitals. FLA. STAT. § 768.40 (1983). The stat-
ute insulates all "health care provider" participants on the committee from any "monetary
liability" to the extent that they act in their capacity as committee members and only so
long as they operate "without malice or fraud." The statute also bars discovery of any mate-
rial used or compulsion of any testimony given during the committee evaluation in a subse-
quent civil action brought by the subject of the evaluation and review against committee
participants. An exception may be made where the material is otherwise available and just
happened to be used in the committee proceeding or where the testimony sought relates to
matters already within the knowledge of the particular witness.
It should be noted that the discovery bar cannot be raised to preclude such evidence in
the trial of a federal cause of action. Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mohammed, 586
F.2d 530, 544 n.9 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979).
See generally Comment, Medical Peer Review Protection in the Health Care Industry,
52 TEMP. L.Q. 552 (1979); Comment, The Legal Liability of Medical Peer Review Partici-
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in the form of actions alleging state5 and federal6 antitrust viola-
tions, substantive and procedural due process errors,' defamation,8
federal civil rights violations,9 conspiracy,10 breach of contractual
obligations, 1 and tortious interference with contractual and busi-
ness relationships, 2 among many other theories of recovery and
relief.
The threat of these suits, which are now well established in volu-
minous case law and legal literature,13 significantly deters most
hospitals from taking any adverse action with respect to the medi-
cal privileges of one of their staff without well-grounded and verifi-
able justification. But the concomitant exposure to suits by ag-
pants for Revocation of Hospital Staff Privileges, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 692 (1978).
5. See, e.g., Hackett v. Metropolitan Gen. Hosp., 422 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
6. The United States Supreme Court very recently addressed, for the first time, the issue
of the exclusive contract for medical services in Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 104 S.
Ct. 1551 (1984). In Hyde, the defendant hospital had a contract with a firm of anesthesiolo-
gists requiring all anesthesiological services for the hospital's patients to be performed by
that firm. Because of the exclusive contract, an anesthesiologist who applied to the hospi-
tal's medical staff was denied admission. Following his rejection, he sued the hospital in
federal court alleging that the exclusive contract was an illegal tying arrangement violative
of the Sherman Act. A majority of the Court, per Justice Stevens, refused to apply the per
se rule of illegality to the tie of otherwise separate services because the record, according to
the Court, did not convincingly demonstrate that the market power of the defendant hospi-
tal was such that the patients in the hospital's locality were "forced" to also purchase the
contracting firm's anesthesiological services. Id. at 1566-67. Nor did the record show in the
absence of per se liability that the challenged contract unreasonably restrained competition
in the market for anesthesiological services. Id. at 1567-68.
See also Cardio-Medical Ass'n v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 721 F.2d 68 (3d Cir.
1983); Feldman v. Jackson Mem. Hosp., 571 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Miller v. Indi-
ana Hosp., 562 F. Supp. 1259 (W.D. Pa. 1983); Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842
(W.D. Pa. 1981); Drexel, The Antitrust Implications of the Denial of Hospital Staff Privi-
leges, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 207 (1982); Grad, The Antitrust Laws and Professional Disci-
pline in Medicine, 1978 DuKE L.J. 443; Heitler, Health Care and Antitrust, 14 U. TOL. L.
REV. 577 (1983); Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, Antitrust and Hospital Privileges:
Testing the Conventional Wisdom, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 595 (1982).
7. See, e.g., Northeast Ga. Radiological Assocs. v. Tidwell, 670 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1982).
8. See, e.g., Brandwein v. Gustman, 367 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
9. See, e.g., Pao v. Holy Redeemer Hosp., 547 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
10. See, e.g., Buckner v. Lower Fla. Keys Hosp. Dist., 403 So. 2d 1025, 1027 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1981) (court said that physician's pleading was "prolix, duplicitous, scandalous, and
impertinent").
11. Berberian v. Lancaster Osteo. Hosp. Ass'n, 149 A.2d 456 (Pa. 1959).
12. Campbell v. St. Mary's Hosp., 252 N.W.2d 581 (Minn. 1977).
13. See, e.g., Cray, Due Process Considerations in Hospital Staff Privileges Cases, 7
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 217 (1979); Horton & Mulholland, The Legal Status of the Hospital
Medical Staff, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 485 (1978); McCall, A Hospital's Liability for Denying,
Suspending and Granting Staff Privileges, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 175 (1980); Southwick, The
Hospital as an Institution-Expanding Responsibilities Change Its Relationship with the
Staff Physician, 9 CAL. W.L. REV. 429 (1973); Comment, Physician-Hospital Conflict: The
Hospital Staff Privileges Controversy in New York, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1075 (1975).
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grieved former patients blaming the hospital for its negligent
review or retention of an impaired or inadequate physician forces
the hospital into the treacherous, if untenable, position of having
to navigate between potentially monstrous liabilities reminiscent of
Scylla and Charybdis.14
14. Because doctors were not considered employees of the hospital but rather indepen-
dent contractors, the hospital traditionally was not liable to patients for the negligent acts
or omissions of its medical staff under the theory of respondeat superior. Combined with
charitable immunity this notion effectively precluded recovery against the hospital for medi-
cal malpractice. But the arrival of Darling v. Charleston Community Mem. Hosp., 211
N.E.2d 253 (Il. 1965), spawned the ever increasing line of cases supporting the concept of
"corporate negligence" or institutional liability. There are significant differences in the theo-
retical bases and specific applications of corporate negligence, but essentially the doctrine
refers to the independent duty of the hospital to use reasonable care in the selection and
supervision of its medical staff, since generally the governing board and not the medical
staff or one of its subcommittees (e.g., the credentials committee) bears the ultimate respon-
sibility for staff privileges decisions. See Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 301
N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1981), noted in Note, Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hospital: Cor-
porate Liability of Hospitals Arrives in Wisconsin, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 453; Copeland, Hospi-
tal Responsibility for Basic Care Provided by Medical Staff Members: "Am I My Brother's
Keeper?," 5 N. Ky. L. REV. 27 (1978); Couch, Hospital Corporate Liability for Inadequate
Quality Assurance in Pennsylvania, 2 J. LEGAL MED. 14 (1980); Goldberg, The Duty of
Hospitals and Hospital Medical Staffs To Regulate the Quality of Patient Care: A Legal
Perspective, 14 PAC. L.J. 55 (1982); Rubsamen, Even More Legal Controls on the Physi-
cian's Hospital Practice, 292 NEw ENG. J. MED. 917 (1975); Southwick, The Hospital's New
Responsibility, 17 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 146 (1968); Spero, Hospital Liability, 15 TRIAL 22
(1979); Walkup & Kelly, Hospital Liability: Changing Patterns of Responsibility, 8
U.S.F.L. REv. 247 (1973); Note, Judicial Recognition of Hospital Independent Duty of Care
to Patients: Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 30 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 711 (1981); Comment, The
Hospital's Responsibility for Its Medical Staff: Prospects for Corporate Negligence in Cali-
fornia, 8 PAC. L.J. 141 (1977); Note, Hospital Corporate Liability: An Effective Solution to
Controlling Private Physician Incompetence?, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 342 (1979); Comment,
Hospital Liability for the Negligence of Physicians: Some Needed Legal Sutures, 26 U.
FLA. L. REV. 844 (1974); Comment, The Hospital-Physician Relationship: Hospital Respon-
sibility for Malpractice of Physicians, 50 WASH. L. REV. 385 (1975).
For a practical work with "how to do it" suggestions, see Strodel, The Impaired Physi-
cian-Hospital Corporate Liability, 24 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 488 (1981).
One author argues flatly that the courts may have imposed corporate negligence because
of the "ever-broadening 'deep pocket' theory of liability, namely, to place the burden of
liability upon the party most able to absorb it .... [T]he hospital and, therefore, its insur-
ance carrier are more capable of bearing the loss of malpractice cases." Stanczyk, The Hos-
pital Dilemma-To Staff or Not To Staff, 25 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 138, 148 (1975). A much
more principled and somewhat less cynical criticism of corporate negligence as applied to
hospitals may be found in Comment, Piercing the Doctrine of Corporate Liability, 17 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 383, 400 (1980), which concludes that "[tihe most logical defendants are
those physicians [on the medical staff] who are on actual notice of the primary defendant's
incompetency." The theory of shifting away from corporate liability of the hospital in favor
of holding liable individual members of the medical staff with actual knowledge of one of
their peers' incompetency has severe practical difficulties in Florida because of Forster v.
Fishermen's Hosp., 363 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). In Forster, the chief of the medical
staff filed suit against the hospital to challenge the hospital's reappointment to the medical
19841
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The purpose of this comment is to explore the medical staff
privileges controversy in Florida, which hitherto has not been ex-
amined in any comprehensive manner. This is truly unfortunate,
particularly because certain recent Florida decisions regarding
medical staff privileges are patently incorrect and in direct contra-
vention of Florida statutory law, as we shall see. This analysis of
the medical privileges problem in Florida will include numerous
useful references to authorities addressing certain troublesome as-
pects of this problem in other jurisdictions, not only by way of
comparison, but also with a view towards assisting the practitioner
whose usual metier is not what could be described under the amor-
phous ascription: "hospital law."
II. BACKGROUND: PUBLIC-PRIVATE DISTINCTION
The traditional rule in most jurisdictions has been that a "pub-
lic" hospital is constrained by, among other things, substantive
and procedural due process requirements in dealings with its medi-
cal staff, while a "private" hospital, so long as it does not violate
its own internal bylaws,'15 is free to take adverse action against the
privileges of one of its medical staff essentially at will.' 6 In West
staff of "a certain physician whose medical staff privileges had been previously revoked for
unprofessionalism and patient neglect." Id. at 841. The Third District affirmed the trial
court's dismissal for lack of standing because the board of trustees of the hospital bore
ultimate authority and responsibility to reinstate the physician, such that the chief of staff's
individual rights were not challenged. Id.
15. Even in those jurisdictions where the actions of private hospitals in dealing with
their medical staffs are not considered judicially reviewable, private hospitals must generally
still follow their own bylaws; if the bylaws of a given private hospital accord medical staff
members certain procedural protections to which they would not otherwise be legally enti-
tled, the hospital must provide these protections. See Margolin v. Morton F. Plant Hosp.
Ass'n, 348 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (court remanded for possible injunctive relief
against private hospital which violated its bylaws); Nagib v. St. Therese Hosp., Inc., 355
N.E.2d 211, 213 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976); McElhinney v. William Booth Mem. Hosp., 544 S.W.2d
216, 218 (Ky. 1976) ("whether the hospital is public or private, it must act in accordance
with its charter and by-laws"). The usual reason for this rule is that the bylaws adopted by
the medical staff and approved by the hospital constitute a binding contract between the
former and the latter. Anne Arundel Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. O'Brien, 432 A.2d 483, 488 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1981); Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 419 A.2d 1191, 1193 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (court
held that hospitals are held to a "standard of strict compliance" with their bylaws); St.
John's Hosp. Medical Staff v. St. John Regional Medical Center, 245 N.W.2d 472, 474 (S.D.
1976). But cf. Todd v. Physicians & Surgeons Community Hosp., Inc., 302 S.E.2d 378, 383
(Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (hospital held to have an "absolute right to change the bylaws with
reference to the hospital's use by doctors"); Bello v. South Shore Hosp., 429 N.E.2d 1011,
1016 (Mass. 1981) ("[clontractual rights ... do not arise upon an application for member-
ship but only when such application is accepted by the corporation").
16. See, e.g., Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hosp., 507 F.2d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1974);
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Coast Hospital Association v. Hoare,"7 the Florida Supreme Court
accepted the following distinction between private and public
hospitals:
A private hospital is one founded and maintained by private per-
sons or a corporation, the state or municipality having no voice in
the management or control of its property or the formation of
rules for its government.. . . A hospital. . . endowed by the gov-
ernment for general charity is a public corporation; and a public
hospital may be defined in general as an institution owned by the
public and devoted chiefly to public uses and purposes.'"
With this definition in mind, the court in Hoare recognized that a
private hospital may in reality be supported by state and local
funds and that it is an entity affected with a public purpose, but
the court concluded nevertheless that, absent legislative enact-
ment, the governing authorities of private hospitals have virtually
unbridled discretion to grant and control the privileges of their
medical staffs.19 Similarly, the Third District Court of Appeal, in
Monyek v. Parkway General Hospital, Inc.,20 rejected a physi-
Ward v. St. Anthony Hosp., 476 F.2d 671, 675 (10th Cir. 1973); Sokol v. University Hosp.,
Inc., 402 F. Supp. 1029, 1032 (D. Mass. 1975); Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 319 F.
Supp. 252, 259-61 (D.D.C. 1970); Moore v. Andalusia Hosp., Inc., 224 So. 2d 617, 619 (Ala.
1969); Edson v. Griffin Hosp., 144 A.2d 341, 344 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1958); Todd v. Physicians
& Surgeons Community Hosp., Inc., 302 S.E.2d 378, 383 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983); Settler v.
Hopedale Medical Found., 400 N.E.2d 577, 579 (11. Ct. App. 1980); Yarnell v. Sisters of St.
Francis Health Serv., Inc., 446 N.E.2d 359, 361 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Natale v. Sisters of
Mercy, 52 N.W.2d 701, 709 (Iowa 1952); Clark v. Physicians & Surgeons Hosp., Inc., 121 So.
2d 752, 754 (La. Ct. App. 1960); Levin v. Sinai Hosp., 46 A.2d 298, 301 (Md. Ct. App. 1946);
Bello v. South Shore Hosp., 429 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (Mass. 1981); Hoffman v. Garden City
Hosp.-Osteo., 321 N.W.2d 810, 813 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Akopiantz v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 333 P.2d 611, 613 (N.M. 1958); Ponca City Hosp., Inc. v. Murphree, 545 P.2d 738,
741 (Okla. 1976); Hagan v. Osteopathic Gen. Hosp., 232 A.2d 596, 600 (R.I. 1967); Strauss v.
Marlboro County Gen. Hosp., 194 S.E. 65 (S.C. 1937); Nashville Mem. Hosp. v. Binkley, 534
S.W.2d 318 (Tenn. 1976); Hodges v. Arlington Neuropsychiatric Center, Inc., 628 S.W.2d
536, 538 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982); Khoury v. Community Mer. Hosp., Inc., 123 S.E.2d 533, 539
(Va. 1962); State ex rel. Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 140 S.E.2d 457, 462 (W. Va.
1965).
17. 64 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1953).
18. Id. at 296-97 (quoting 41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 1 (1944)). This definition appears to be
typical of those offered elsewhere in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Shulman v. Washington
Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59, 61 (D.D.C. 1963), remanded on other grounds, 348 F.2d 70
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
19. Hoare, 64 So. 2d at 297-98. Lest the author be accused of hyperbole in the use of the
description "virtually unbridled discretion" above, the Florida Supreme Court later itself
declared the rule of private hospital control over its medical staff as one of "absolute discre-
tion" in North Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Mizell, 148 So. 2d 1, 3 n.6 (Fla. 1962).
20. 273 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973).
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cian's argument that a private hospital could be considered "quasi-
public" and hence not immune from judicial review with respect to
its medical staff decisions. Following the supreme court's lead in
the Hoare decision, the Monyek court refused to deem a private
hospital as quasi-public even in the face of allegations that fifty
percent of the hospital's patients received Medicare benefits and
that part of the land used by the hospital was donated by the City
of North Miami Beach.21
Even when the Florida courts do consider a hospital a public
institution, and therefore subject to substantive and procedural
due process, hospital boards are regarded as having "great discre-
tion" in dealing with medical staff privileges:22
Usually, the [public] hospital's discretion is limited only by the
constitutional requirement that the standards for privileges be
reasonably related to furthering the goal of providing high quality
patient care, that the power of the hospital not be exercised in an
unreasonably arbitrary and capricious manner and that the deci-
sions of the hospital be subject to judicial review.23
In affording substantial deference to public hospital boards in
their decisions concerning medical privileges, the Florida Supreme
Court in particular has staunchly followed a posture which could
well be described by the oft-quoted injunction: "Courts must not
attempt to take on the escutcheon of Caduceus. '' 24 Early decisions
emphasized that the mere fact that a given hospital was public
rather than private conferred no special right of access upon tax-
paying citizen-physicians,2 and that medical practice in public
hospitals was a "privilege rather than a right."26 The supreme
court's last pronouncement in this area held that public hospitals
are essentially exempt from the usual requirement that profes-
sional or occupational licensing authorities have precise and spe-
cific standards of competency and of review. By way of explanation
21. Id. at 432-33.
22. Sarasota County Pub. Hosp. Bd. v. Shawhay, 408 So. 2d 644, 647 (Fla. 2d DCA
1981).
23. Id.
24. Sosa v. Board of Managers of Val Verde Mem. Hosp., 437 F.2d 173, 177 (5th Cir.
1971).
25. Green v. City of St. Petersburg, 17 So. 2d 517, 518-19 (Fla. 1944). Justice Chapman,
concurring in Green, apparently took special solace in the city's minimum physician compe-
tency rules: "It is clear that these rules close the door against possible dope fiends, liquor
heads, and practitioners not qualified to perform major surgical operations." Id. at 520.
26. Bryant v. City of Lakeland, 28 So. 2d 106, 110 (Fla. 1946).
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for this broad latitude, the court stated: "Detailed description of
[physician misconduct] is concededly impossible, perhaps even un-
desirable in view of rapidly shifting standards of medical excel-
lence and the fact that a human life may be and quite often is
involved in the ultimate decision of the board." 7
It should be noted that while Florida courts have supported a
sharp public-private distinction among hospitals, other jurisdic-
tions have departed from this rule, largely because of judicial dis-
taste for the seemingly excessive and hence potentially unfair
power private hospitals have over their medical staffs. A few states,
most notably California,28 Hawaii,19 and New Jersey, 30 have re-
fused to follow this distinction and, consequently, subject medical
staff decisions of private hospitals to thorough judicial scrutiny.
California courts, for instance, abolished the public-private dis-
tinction based upon their interpretation of legislative enactment
and what is apparently a California common law notion that a pri-
vate entity lacks absolute discretion to deprive one of a substantial
right.31
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, on the other hand, looked to
that state's common law to deem a private hospital "quasi-public."
The court stated in Greisman v. Newcomb Hospital: [Wjhile the
managing officials [of a private hospital] may have discretionary
powers in the selection of the medical staff, those powers are
deeply imbedded in public aspects, and are rightly viewed, for pol-
icy reasons . .. , as fiduciary powers to be exercised reasonably
and for the public good.32
Other courts have followed the lead of California, New Jersey,
and Hawaii in finding that private hospitals, given their public
functions and public funding, are really quasi-public and hence
subject to judicial review in their dealings with their medical
staffs." Some courts, expressly under the influence of the growing
27. North Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Mizell, 148 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1962).
28. See, e.g., Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 140 Cal. Rptr. 442, 448-52 (1977);
Ascherman v. San Francisco Medical Soc'y, 114 Cal. Rptr. 681, 696 (Ct. App. 1974).
29. See, e.g., Silver v. Castle Mem. Hosp., 497 P.2d 564, 570 (Hawaii), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1048 (1972).
30. See, e.g., Guerrero v. Burlington County Mem. Hosp., 360 A.2d 334, 340 (N.J. 1976);
Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 192 A.2d 817, 822-24 (N.J. 1963).
31. See Ascherman, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 695-98.
32. Greisman, 192 A.2d at 824 (citing Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 170
A.2d 791 (N.J. 1961)).
33. See, e.g., Storrs v. Lutheran Hosp. & Homes Soc'y of America, 609 P.2d 24, 28
(Alaska 1980).
1984]
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minority of jurisdictions abandoning the public-private dichotomy,
have adopted what amounts to a hybrid approach between abso-
lute discretion and quasi-public status, thereby subjecting the pri-
vate hospital to limited judicial review typically to ensure that pro-
fessional criteria are neither imposed nor applied arbitrarily,
capriciously, or unreasonably."'
Although the specific reasons offered by the jurisdictions which
have abandoned the public-private dichotomy vary somewhat in
scope and character," all appear to share a fundamental recogni-
tion that the absoluteness inherent in such a dichotomy is unreal-
istic and Manichaean because
in this modern era of technical and therefore expensive health
care, it is almost impossible for a hospital to be completely pri-
vate in its ownership, operation and funding. Government grants
are necessary for the survival of the modern hospital and the con-
commitant [sic] regulation by the government is increasingly per-
vasive. It is this local, state and federal assistance and involve-
ment with formally private hospitals that provides the basis on
which a court could decide that public involvement has become so
great that the private hospital should be subjected to public
treatment.3 6
34. See, e.g., Peterson v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., Inc., 559 P.2d 186, 191 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1976); Hawkins v. Kinsie, 540 P.2d 345, 349 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); Bricker v. Sceva Speare
Mem. Hosp., 281 A.2d 589, 592 (N.H.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971); Khan v. Suburban
Community Hosp., 340 N.E.2d 398, 401-03 (Ohio 1976); Woodward v. Porter Hosp., Inc., 217
A.2d 37, 40 (Vt. 1966). But see Even v. Longmont United Hosp. Ass'n, 629 P.2d 1100, 1103
(Colo. Ct. App. 1981) (court stated that denial of medical staff privileges in a private hospi-
tal "is a matter solely within the discretion of its managing authorities and is not a proper
subject of certiorari review").
35. Two excellent works offer well reasoned and compelling arguments in support of
common law approaches to judicial review of staff privileges decisions by private hospitals.
See McMahon, Judicial Review of Internal Policy Decisions of Private Nonprofit Hospi-
tals: A Common Law Approach, 3 Am. J. LAW & MED. 149 (1977); Comment, Hospital Med-
ical Staff: When Are Privilege Denials Judicially Reviewable?, 11 MICH. J.L. REF. 95 (1977).
36. Cray, supra note 13, at 226. A recent publication by the Florida Hospital Association
offers the following breakdown in Florida:
Community hospitals comprised 85.3% of Florida hospitals in 1981 .... Non-
government, not-for-profit community hospitals represented 33.7% of Florida's
hospitals and 38.5% of Florida's hospital beds. Investor owned community hospi-
tals had 29% of all hospitals and 23.6% of all hospital beds in Florida. State and
local government hospitals represented 22.6% of Florida's hospitals and 18.3% of
Florida's hospital beds. A salient feature of Florida's hospital industry is its
healthy [no pun apparently intended] investor owned sector and the growth that
the sector has experienced from 1972 to 1981.
FLORIDA HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, FLORIDA HOSPITALS: THE FACTS (2d ed. 1983). From this
very brief breakdown it is obvious that the absurdly simplistic public-private distinction is
unwarranted in Florida, notwithstanding its perpetuation in Florida case law.
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A phenomenon directly related to judicial recognition of the fal-
lacy behind the public-private distinction was the appearance dur-
ing the 1970's of state and particularly federal3 7 court decisions
holding that certain characteristics of private hospitals, especially
heavy state and federal funding,3 8 rendered them state actors for
purposes of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. This state ac-
tion designation in turn implicated due process guarantees in deci-
sions by private hospitals on medical privileges. Thus, for instance,
until very recently the rule in the Fourth Circuit was that the mere
receipt of Hill-Burton funds39 constituted state action such that
otherwise private hospitals must act in accordance with federal
precepts of due process.40 But this perception of the constitutional
impact of Hill-Burton and similar funding has been rejected in
every other federal circuit that has confronted the issue, and the
former view of the Fourth Circuit'1 is almost certainly incorrect in
37. See, e.g., Schlein v. Milford Hosp., 423 F. Supp. 541, 542 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 561
F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1977) (affirming result only and disagreeing with finding of state action).
38. The greatest amount of litigation concerning the question of when a hospital is
deemed to be public has revolved around the effect that the receipt of funds under
the Hospital Survey and Construction Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 291-291m (West 1983)]
has on private hospitals. The purpose of the legislation, popularly known as the
Hill-Burton Act, is to provide states with money to assist in the construction and
modernization of public and private hospitals, develop new and improved medical
facilities and promote research.
Cray, supra note 13, at 228-29 (footnotes omitted).
The Hill-Burton Act was merely one component of a package of health care legislation
offered by President Truman beginning in 1946. The major thrust of the package was a
program of national health insurance, an idea which President Truman carried forward
from the Roosevelt administration and which he unsuccessfully sought to persuade Congress
to enact during both of his terms in office. The American Medical Association (AMA) sup-
ported the Hill-Burton Act, but the organization vehemently, if disingenuously, denounced
national health insurance as socialized medicine which, according to one AMA sponsored
pamphlet, would be "the keystone to the arch of the Socialist State." P. STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 285 (1982). Indeed, in 1950 alone the AMA "spent
$2.25 million in its 'national education campaign' against national health insurance." Id. at
287.
39. See supra note 38.
40. Christhilf v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 496 F.2d 174, 178 (4th Cir. 1974);
Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 967 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 938 (1964).
41. The Fourth Circuit abandoned its obdurate view of the effect of Hill-Burton funding
in Modaber v. Culpeper Mem. Hosp., Inc., 674 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir. 1982), where the court
held that a private hospital which, inter alia, was built with 55% of its construction funds
coming from a Hill-Burton grant and which accepted patients receiving Medicare and Medi-
caid funds, was not a state actor for purposes of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 1026-27.
All of the other federal circuits, except the First and Eleventh, which have yet to address
the issue squarely, are in accord with the revised Fourth Circuit position. See Loh-Seng Yo
v. Cibola Gen. Hosp., 706 F.2d 306, 308 (10th Cir. 1983); Newsome v. Vanderbilt Univ., 653
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light of the United States Supreme Court's holdings in Rendell-
Baker v. Kohn42 and Blum v. Yaretsky,"3 which were both decided
by the Court on the same day.
In Blum, the Court looked at private nursing homes participat-
ing in a state program which provided Medicaid assistance to eligi-
ble people receiving care in those homes. The Court held that al-
though a substantial ream of state and federal regulations
controlled the program, the private nursing homes were not state
actors with respect to their internal decisions regarding the varia-
ble levels of eligibility of those receiving nursing care." The Su-
preme Court also noted that the decision to discharge or to refer
the patients to lower levels of care was a medical judgment which
could not be attributed to the state because it was rendered "in
accordance with professional canons of ethics, rather than dictated
by any rule of conduct imposed by the State. '45 This remark bears
significant relevance for the governing boards of private hospitals,
which are typically composed of laymen who rely heavily on the
advice and recommendations of the hospital's medical staff in their
decisions affecting medical privileges.
In Rendell-Baker, the receipt by a privately operated school for
maladjusted high school students of public funds accounting for at
least ninety percent of its operating budget did not transform the
school into a person acting under color of state law." Not surpris-
F.2d 1100 (6th Cir. 1981); Hodge v. Paoli Mem. Hosp., 576 F.2d 563, 564 (3d Cir. 1978);
Musso v. Suriano, 586 F.2d 59, 62-63 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1978); Schlein v.
Milford, Inc., 561 F.2d 427, 431 (2d Cir. 1977); Madry v. Sorel, 558 F.2d 303, 305 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Briscoe v. Bock, 540 F.2d 392, 394-96 (8th Cir.
1976); Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center, 520 F.2d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 1975).
42. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
43. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
44. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1002-12.
45. Id. at 1009.
46. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 839-43. Petitioner in the Rendell-Baker case, a former
counselor at the school, sued the director of the school and others under the federal civil
rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging wrongful discharge from the school in violation of
her first, fifth, and fourteenth amendment rights. The Court held, per Chief Justice Burger,
that the question of whether the respondents acted under color of state law for purposes of
§ 1983 is the "same question" posed in cases presenting the issue of state action under the
fourteenth amendment. Rendell-Baker, 457 at 830, 837-38.
Since Florida's own constitutional due process guarantees, FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9, are
interpreted as offering merely the same and not broader protection as their federal counter-
parts, the effect of the Rendell-Baker and Blum decisions therefore controls the same issue
under the state constitution. See South Fla. Chapter of the Assoc'd Gen. Contrs. of America,
Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 552 F. Supp. 909, 928 (S.D. Fla. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 723 F.2d 846 (11th Cir. 1984); Florida Canners Ass'n v. Department of Citrus, 371
So. 2d 503, 513 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), af'd sub noma., Coca-Cola Co., Food Div. v. Department
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ingly, federal court decisions since Blum and Rendell-Baker have
soundly rejected assertions that private hospitals receiving huge
amounts of state and federal funding are either acting under color
of state law or operating as state entities under the mandates of
the fourteenth amendment.47
III. FLORIDA STATUTORY IMPOSITION OF JCAH STANDARDS
A. Outline of the JCAH
In 1975, the Florida legislature enacted section 395.065, Florida
Statutes, which set forth the criteria by which the medical staff of
any licensed hospital could control the staff privileges of its mem-
of Citrus, 406 So. 2d 1079 (Fla.), appeal dismissed sub noma., Kraft, Inc. v. Department of
Citrus, 456 U.S. 1002 (1982).
47. Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 562 F. Supp. 1259, 1275-78 (W.D. Pa. 1983); Taylor v. Flint
Osteo. Hosp., Inc., 561 F. Supp. 1152, 1157-59 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Chico Fern. Women's
Health Center v. Butte Glenn Medical Soc'y, 557 F. Supp. 1190, 1194-97 (E.D. Cal. 1983);
Pao v. Holy Redeemer Hosp., 547 F. Supp. 484, 491-92 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
It is important to note that the Blum and Rendell-Baker decisions do not necessarily
overrule or even cast doubt on the opinions of those courts which have ruled that private
hospitals are quasi-public, see supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text, because they, inter
alia, receive Hill-Burton funds. These decisions are really a matter of state law dealing with
such state policy concepts as the public responsibilities of private fiduciary bodies, e.g., hos-
pital boards of trustees. See, e.g., Davidson v. Youngstown Hosp. Ass'n, 250 N.E.2d 892, 895
(Ohio Ct. App. 1969) ("the power of the [medical] staff of such a [private] hospital to pass
on staff membership applications is a fiduciary power to be exercised reasonably and for the
public good").
Yet there is bound to be considerable confusion over this because once these courts arrive
at the quasi-public designation in order to provide private hospital physicians with some
measure of procedural protections, they invariably speak in terms of "due process," when
really no process is due at all, at least in the federal constitutional sense. See, e.g., Silver v.
Castle Mem. Hosp., 497 P.2d 564, 571-72 (Hawaii), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972). What
these courts actually mean (absent specific reliance upon state constitutional due process
guarantees broader than the fourteenth amendment), is due process-like protections, conve-
niently borrowed from federal law to a designation arrived at through a state common law
policy decision. Some courts clearly understand this distinction. See, e.g., Jain v. Northwest
Community Hosp., 385 N.E.2d 108, 111 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978). Other courts seem utterly con-
founded over the difference between analyzing the impact of Hill-Burton funding for pur-
poses of the fourteenth amendment and for purposes of the quasi-public designation as a
matter of state law. See, e.g., North Valley Hosp., Inc. v. Kauffman, 544 P.2d 1219, 1221-24
(Mont. 1976); Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 419 A.2d 1191, 1194-95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
One very good approach for courts that wish to provide procedural protections for private
hospital physicians while avoiding the muddle over the quasi-public analysis is to interpret
the relevant state constitutional provision dealing with due process more broadly than its
federal counterparts in the fifth and fourteenth amendments. For a discussion of how a
growing number of state courts are finding real substance in their respective constitutions as
a refreshing alternative (which even comports with the so-called "New Federalism") to
mindlessly following federal constitutional interpretations jot for jot and case by case, see
generally Collins, Rebirth of Reliance on State Charters, NAT'L LAW J., Mar. 12, 1984, at 25.
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bers. ' This statute's current version, section 395.0115, with minor
changes from the original,49 authorizes the governing board of any
"licensed facility" (hence including both private and public hospi-
tals) to "suspend, deny, revoke, or curtail the staff privileges" of
any physician for "good cause" after considering the recommenda-
tions of its medical staff.5 0 The statute then gives nonexclusive il-
lustrations of "good cause," which include: incompetence, habitual
and dangerous addiction to intoxicants or drugs, an adjudication of
medical malpractice liability, and mental or physical impairment. 1
The procedures required for both public and private hospitals in
taking adverse action with respect to staff privileges "shall comply
with the standards outlined" by, among other organizations, the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH).52 Finally,
subdivision 2 of section 395.0115 immunizes the hospital, its gov-
erning board and its individual members, and the medical staff or
other disciplinary body "for any action taken in good faith and
without malice in carrying out the provisions of this section. '5 3 We
shall hold any discussion of this immunity; for now, let us proceed
to briefly review the JCAH.
48. See FLA. STAT. § 395.065 (1975) (repealed 1982).
49. See infra text accompanying notes 132-35.
50. FLA. STAT. § 395.0115 (1983) provides in relevant part:
(1) The governing board of any licensed facility, after considering the recom-
mendations of its medical staff, is authorized to suspend, deny, revoke, or curtail
the staff privileges of any staff member for good cause, including, but not limited
to:
(a) Incompetence.
(b) Negligence.
(c) Being found to be a habitual user of intoxicants or drugs to the extent
that he is deemed dangerous to himself or others.
(d) Being found liable for medical malpractice by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
(e) Mental or physical impairment which may adversely affect patient
care.
However, the procedures for such actions shall comply with the standards out-
lined by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, the American Osteo-
pathic Association, the Accreditation Association for Ambulatory Health Care,
and the "Medicare/Medicaid Conditions of Participation."
(2) There shall be no liability on the part of, and no cause of action of any
nature shall arise against, any licensed facility, its governing body and governing
body members, medical staff, or disciplinary body, or its agents or employees for
any action taken in good faith and without malice in carrying out the provisions of
this section.
51. Id.
52. Id. See Jost, The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals: Private Regula-
tion of Health Care and the Public Interest, 24 B.C.L. REV. 835 (1983).
53. FLA. STAT. § 395.0115(2) (1983).
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The JCAH is a private, nonprofit corporation founded in 1951
which provides accreditation services primarily for public and pri-
vate hospitals but also for other health related facilities.54 JCAH
accreditation is theoretically voluntary, and the JCAH does not
view accreditation as a scheme of public regulation, but rather re-
gards itself as a private quality control consultant paid by and re-
sponsible to the health care industry.5 The hospital or other facil-
ity must request of its own volition an accreditation survey by the
JCAH staff, who analyze and record the survey results and then
recommend their decision for or against accreditation to a subcom-
mittee of the JCAH Board of Commissioners, the organization's
governing body.56 JCAH accreditation follows only upon the facil-
ity's substantial compliance with JCAH standards overall, al-
though a facility need not comply substantially with every JCAH
standard. 57 As Professor Jost explains, JCAH accreditation is only
voluntary in the de jure sense, since "hospital accreditation is ei-
ther explicitly or implicitly a requirement for participation in
many private or public licensing, certification and financing pro-
grams." 58 Specifically, for instance, JCAH accreditation essentially
results in automatic qualification, referred to as "deemed" certifi-
cation status, of a health care facility for participation in the Medi-
care program, thus supplanting the requirement otherwise for state
health departments to survey hospitals in order to assess their
compliance with Medicare regulations. 9
Similarly, according to Professor Jost, thirty-eight states have,
"to varying degrees," also "incorporated JCAH standards or ac-
creditation decisions into their licensing programs for health care
institutions." 60 Florida is one of these states which specifically ac-
commodates JCAH hospital standards in the state's hospital li-
censing program. Section 395.006, for example, requires the Florida
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) to "ac-
cept, in lieu of its own periodic inspections for licensure, the survey
54. Jost, supra note 52, at 841-42.
55. Id. at 842-43.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 842.
58. Id. at 843.
59. Id. at 843, 852-57.
60. Id. at 844. JCAH accreditation is very important for a hospital's "standing in the
professional community" and its "public image." See American Int'l Hosp. v. Chicago Trib-
une, 458 N.E.2d 1305, 1308 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (hospital sued the JCAH and the Tribune
alleging a false report of JCAH's refusal to accredit the hospital).
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or inspection of an accrediting organization"" I (which by statutory
definition includes the JCAH6 2), so long as the facility's accredita-
tion is not provisional and provided that the facility releases and
sends to HRS the accreditation organization's survey.6 3 In sum, the
JCAH is a private entity which has had and continues to have "a
significant impact on the development of institutional medical care
in America, and continues to play a major role in determining the
nature of that care."'64
B. JCAH Medical Staff Standards and Due Process
We may now ask just what is meant by the Florida statutory
mandate that the "procedures" used for adverse action vis-a-vis a
physician's staff privileges must comply with the "standards out-
lined" by the JCAH.68 The standards outlined by the JCAH are
those found in the now annually updated JCAH Accreditation
Manual for Hospitals and the procedures used are those revealed
in the Manual's chapter entitled "Medical Staff. ' 66 The chapter on
the Medical Staff is notable for its distinct lack of anything resem-
bling a model code of staff bylaws, something formerly attempted
by the JCAH but since abandoned. 7 In fact, the chapter on the
Medical Staff for the 1985 edition of the Accreditation Manual for
Hospitals is somewhat more general and abbreviated where due
process-like standards are concerned than its immediate predeces-
sor in the 1984 edition.68 However, the fundamental demands of a
fair hearing, basic evenhandedness among the medical staff, and
openness about requisite professional criteria and the internal
61. FLA. STAT. § 395.006(2)(a) (1983).
62. Id. § 395.002(1).
63. Id. § 395.006(2)(a).
64. Jost, supra note 52, at 923. After an extensive overview of the JCAH, the balance of
Professor Jost's article is a critical and comprehensive analysis of the pros and cons of pri-
vate regulation of health care offered by the JCAH, particularly from a public interest and
macroeconomic perspective.
65. FLA. STAT. § 395.065(1) (1975).
66. JOINT COMMITTEE ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HoS-
PITALS 89 (1984) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL].
67. The JCAH once promulgated its GUIDELINES FOR THE FORMULATION OF MEDICAL
STAFF BYLAWS, RULES, AND REGULATIONS (1971), which still is cited as authoritative by oth-
erwise excellent works, see, e.g., Cray, supra note 13, at 251 n.202, but which is considered
obsolete by the JCAH.
68. The Medical Staff Standards for the 1985 edition of the ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR
HOSPITALS [hereinafter cited as Standards] were approved by the JCAH Board of Commis-
sioners on December 10, 1983. See JCAH Board Approves New Medical Staff Standards, 4
JCAH PERSPECTIVES, Jan.-Feb. 1984, at 1.
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structures of the medical staff-hallmarks of due process-like re-
quirements-are still solidly maintained in the 1985 chapter. The
applicants for medical staff privileges or the staff physician may
not, for instance, be treated arbitrarily: "Professional criteria spec-
ified in the medical staff bylaws and uniformly applied to all appli-
cants or medical staff members constitute the basis for granting
initial or continuing staff membership." 9 Moreover, the profes-
sional criteria used in assessing the abilities and background of the
medical staff applicant or member must be reasonably related to
the primary JCAH goal of providing high quality patient care and
they must be nondiscriminatory:
(a) The criteria are designed to assure the medical staff and
governing body that patients will receive quality care.
(b) The criteria pertain to, at the least, evidence of current li-
censure, relevant training and/or experience, current competence,
and health status.
(c) The criteria may also pertain to other reasonable qualifica-
tions, such as
(1) the ability of the hospital to provide adequate facilities
and supportive services for the applicant and his patients;
(2) patient care needs for additional staff members with
the applicant's skill and training;
(3) current evidence of adequate professional liability in-
surance; and
(4) the geographic location of the applicant.
(d) Sex, race, creed, or national origin are not used in making
decisions regarding medical staff membership.70
Applications for medical staff appointments must be "acted on
within a reasonable period of time" and the final decision by the
governing body on each application must also be made within "a
reasonable period of time." Following an adverse decision or rec-
ommendation regarding an applicant's request for initial appoint-
ment, accredited hospitals must have a "mechanism. . . defined in
the governing body or the medical staff bylaws" for "appropriate
action, including a fair hearing. 71 These same rules apply to those
physicians not necessarily seeking membership on the medical staff
but rather clinical privileges at the hospital. 72
69. Standards, supra note 68, at 2.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2-3.
72. Id. at 8-11.
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The JCAH protections apply, of course, not only to initial appli-
cants but also to current members of the medical staff, whose by-
laws must "include provisions for at least the following":
2. Fair-hearing and appellate review mechanisms, which may
differ for medical staff members and other individuals holding
clinical privileges and for applicants for such membership or
privileges.
3. Mechanisms for corrective action, including indications and
procedures for automatic and summary suspension of an individ-
ual's medical staff membership and/or clinical privileges.
4. A description of the organization of the medical staff, includ-
ing categories of medical staff membership, when such exist, and
appropriate officer positions, with the stipulation that each officer
is a member of the medical staff. The bylaws define
a) the method of selecting officers;
b) the qualifications, responsibilities, and tenures of of-
ficers; and
c) the conditions and mechanisms for removing officers
from their positions.
6. A mechanism designed to assure effective communication
among the medical staff, hospital administration, and governing
body.
7. A mechanism for adopting and amending the bylaws, rules
and regulations, and policies of the medical staff.
9. Medical staff representation and participation in any hospi-
tal deliberation affecting the discharge of medical staff
responsibilities.7 3
By way of comparing and contrasting these JCAH standards
with the requirements of federal due process, one feature in partic-
ular of the required bylaw characteristics listed above is the recog-
nition that "fair-hearing and appellate review mechanisms ...
may differ for medical staff members and other individuals holding
clinical privileges and for applicants for such membership or privi-
leges. ' '74 In this context, "differ" obviously means less in the way of
due process-like requirements. The question arises whether this
"lesser" standard of JCAH protection for initial applicants is the
same or some different level of procedural protection which must
73. Id. at 4.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
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be afforded an initial applicant who is rejected by the governing
board of a public hospital subject to the due process constraints of
the fifth or fourteenth amendments. In answering this question, we
begin with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Board of
Regents v. Roth."
In Roth, a nontenured state university instructor was not re-
hired, allegedly because of his vociferous criticism of university
practices. Before considering Roth's constitutional claims, the
Court announced its now familiar standard that the state action at
issue must have deprived Roth of a protected liberty or property
interest, since fourteenth amendment due process guarantees ex-
tend only to those state actions which can be said to deprive one of
"life, liberty, or property. 7 6 Violation of a protected liberty inter-
est requires the real possibility of serious damage to one's individ-
ual standing and associations in his or her community or the impo-
sition of a stigma which would foreclose his or her freedom to
pursue other employment opportunities. 7 The Court ruled that
because the university made no charge against Roth to damage his
community standing or to stigmatize him in such a way as to fore-
close future employment, Roth therefore had no liberty interest at
stake. 8 Meanwhile, the issue of whether he had a property interest
involved in his employment rested in turn upon whether it could
be said that his contract with the university conferred upon him
certain "specific benefits" arising to the level of a "legitimate claim
of entitlement" to them, regardless of his subjective, "unilateral
expectations. 7 9 Since the provisions of Roth's employment con-
tract called for termination after one year of teaching service with-
out any promise or suggestion of reappointment, the Court found
that there was no specific benefit and hence no legitimate claim of
entitlement to reemployment. Therefore, there was no infringe-
ment of any property interest upon the university's refusal to re-
new the appointment.80 Nor did the Court find, apart from the ex-
press terms of the contract, any informal policy or understanding
between Roth and the university regarding reappointment."1
75. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
76. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
77. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573.
78. Id. at 573-74.
79. Id. at 576-77.
80. Id. at 578.
81. In the companion case of Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-602 (1972), the
Court ruled that where Perry was rehired annually in the absence of a formal tenure system,
he nevertheless had a legitimate claim of entitlement to renewal of his employment contract
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In two subsequent decisions, a majority of the Court agreed that
a protected property interest is implicated if the terms of employ-
ment provide that the employee may only be discharged for
cause,82 but not where the employee holds his or her position "at
the will and pleasure" of the public employer.8 " And as regards the
protected liberty interest, the Court arguably narrowed the scope
of the Roth decision to the extent that it held in Paul v. Davis84
that reputation alone is not constitutionally protected. Davis holds
that the protected liberty interest is confined rather to state action
which alters or extinguishes a previously recognized right or
status.8 5
A few illustrations may now be useful in applying Roth and its
progeny to the context of medical staff privileges. For example, in
Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hospital,86 a physician was ter-
minated during a residency program which he reasonably could
have expected to complete given the hospital's past practices (in
other words, he was not employed "at will"). The Ninth Circuit
found that the physician had a protected property interest in his
because of a de facto tenure system predicated upon university practices and explicit under-
standings between the faculty and the administration.
82. Six members of the Court (i.e., Justices Powell and Blackmun concurring and dis-
senting, Justice White concurring and dissenting, along with Justices Brennan, Douglas, and
Marshall dissenting separately) in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), concluded that
an entitlement to dismissal for cause is a protected property interest.
83. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345 n.8 (1976).
84. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
85. Id. at 711-12.
86. 537 F.2d 361, 366-67 (9th Cir. 1976). The Stretten court also held that the physi-
cian's untimely termination, with accompanying reasons therefor, did not, however, impli-
cate a protected liberty interest because "[l]iberty is not infringed by a label of incompe-
tence," though liberty is infringed by a "stigma of moral turpitude." Id. at 366.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Washington ruled that a physician who was
terminated from a public hospital during a term of his one-year renewable staff appoint-
ment did not have a protected property interest in the remainder of his term of appoint-
ment. Ritter v. Board of Comm'rs, 637 P.2d 940, 944 (Wash. 1981). The effect of the court's
ruling was that Dr. Ritter was an at will member of the medical staff notwithstanding the
fact that he "could assume he would remain a member of the hospital staff absent cause for
dismissal, and he was protected by extensive procedural protections established by the med-
ical staff bylaws [which were violated in his case]." Id. at 944. The majority in Ritter cited
Suckle v. Madison Gen. Hosp., 499 F.2d 1364 (7th Cir. 1974), in support of this proposition.
But Suckle is crucially different in that the issue of whether a property interest existed
there involved a denial of reappointment rather than termination during a term of service.
Id. at 1365. The Suckle court concluded that absent some legitimate expectation of renewal,
such as in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), the physician had no property interest
in reappointment. The lone dissenting justice in Ritter emphasized this crucial distinction,
and it is submitted that his view is correct on this point. See Ritter, 637 P.2d at 951 (Dore,
J., dissenting).
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residency. But where a physician-director of pathology was ap-
pointed by a public hospital upon only an oral contract, absent any
understanding of an entitlement to termination for cause, the
Eighth Circuit recently ruled that his service contract was there-
fore at will, and that his termination by the hospital consequently
did not violate a protected property interest.87
Since hospital bylaws usually provide that privileges are granted
for a stated term of one or two years,8 Stretten typifies the usual
case that a physician will normally have a legitimate expectation of
continued employment during any given term of appointment,
while the situation of the physician whose contract is utterly at
will during such a term as discussed in the Eighth Circuit opinion
is somewhat unusual.8 9 Dismissal during a term of service in which
a physician has a legitimate expectation of continued employment
must be distinguished, however, from appointment and reappoint-
ment. Following the end of his or her specified term of staff ap-
pointment, a physician has no property interest in renewal of ap-
pointment.9 0 Similarly, the physician as initial applicant has no
legitimate claim of entitlement and hence no property interest91
87. Englestad v. Virginia Mun. Hosp., 718 F.2d 262, 266 (8th Cir. 1983).
88. Cray, supra note 13, at 237.
89. Englestad, 718 F.2d at 266.
90. Cray, supra note 13, at 237.
91. Id. Remarkably, the Fifth Circuit, after correctly noting the rule that "physicians
obtain by mere licensure no constitutional right to staff privileges at any particular hospi-
tal," went on to assume without discussion that a thrice rejected applicant was entitled to
procedural due process following his rejection by a public hospital. Truly v. Madison Gen.
Hosp., 673 F.2d 763, 765 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 214 (1982).
Even more bizarre is the decision in Shaw v. Hospital Auth., 614 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1980),
where the same circuit (Judge Brown was the only judge common to both panels, however)
issued a per curiam affirmance of a lower court opinion which was in turn decided upon
remand from the Fifth Circuit's earlier opinion in Shaw v. Hospital Auth., 507 F.2d 625 (5th
Cir. 1975). The Shaw cases arose out of a denial of an application for an initial grant of staff
privileges to a podiatrist by a public hospital. Id. at 627. The earlier Fifth Circuit opinion
held that the podiatrist "in seeking staff privileges at ... [the] hospital, seeks to engage in
his occupation as a podiatrist and this is a [protected] liberty interest." Id. at 628. On re-
mand from this opinion, the lower court "corrected" itself and stated that it was "clear in
the first instance" that the podiatrist's application invoked a liberty interest "emanating
from his state created right to practice podiatry." Shaw, 614 F.2d at 950 (lower court opin-
ion is appended to per curiam affirmance).
Thus, the Shaw opinions equate a mere denial of staff privileges, without more (and from
only one hospital), as an affront to the legitimate liberty interest to pursue one's occupation.
But the denial of the podiatrist's application in the Shaw situation did not in any way alter
or extinguish Dr. Shaw's state created right to practice podiatry. His license was unaffected
by the decision of the governing board of any hospital upon his mere application. The lib-
erty interest in pursuing one's chosen vocation discussed in the United States Supreme
Court opinion relied upon by the Fifth Circuit, Shaw, 507 F.2d at 628, dealt with a Ne-
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because he or she has no constitutional right to practice medicine
in a public hospital,"' and because hospital administrators have
broad discretion to set professional criteria for those physicians
whom they appoint to the medical staff of the hospital. 3
Thus, by providing the initial applicant with a comparatively
limited right to a fair hearing and appellate review, the JCAH
standards go considerably beyond the protection of procedural due
process. But if the JCAH standards for the medical staff purport
to offer more, or at least broader, protection from an unfair or an
incorrect decision regarding a physician's staff privileges, one
might reasonably ask why these standards do not address certain
specific issues which have been litigated in staff privileges cases,
such as representation by counsel,9 ' the right to confront and
braska statute which totally forbade throughout the state the teaching in any private or
public school of any language other than English to any child who had not successfully
completed the eighth grade. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 397-98 (1923). As regards Dr.
Shaw, the scenario envisioned by Meyer and its progeny would occur only if, for instance, a
state examining board suspended his right to practice podiatry at any hospital. See
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975); Ampuero v. Department of Prof. Reg., 410 So. 2d
213, 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (in response to the failure of the Department to grant a doctor
a hearing within six months of an order prohibiting him from prescribing certain drugs, the
court stated: "When the state undertook to temporarily restrict the petitioner's privilege to
practice medicine it had an affirmative duty to grant a post-suspension hearing and one that
would be concluded without appreciable delay.").
Not only was Dr. Shaw still free to practice his chosen field of podiatry, he was already a
member of the medical staff of two private hospitals at the time he filed his complaint.
Shaw, 507 F.2d at 626. It appears, therefore, that the Shaw cases are substantially incorrect
in not distinguishing between "reduced economic returns" and "permanent exclusion from,
or protracted interruption of, gainful employment." Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp.,
537 F.2d 361, 366 (9th Cir. 1976).
92. Hayman v. City of Galveston, 273 U.S. 414, 416-17 (1927).
93. Sosa v. Board of Managers of Val Verde Mem. Hosp., 437 F.2d 173, 177 (5th Cir.
1971).
94. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has opted for what appears thus far to be the
minority view: "In view of the physician's substantial interest in proceedings of this nature,
on balance we believe that the physician should have the right to have counsel present at
mandated hospital hearings with respect to his application for admission to the staff." Gar-
row v. Elizabeth Gen. Hosp., 401 A.2d 533, 542 (N.J. 1979).
The Supreme Court of Hawaii adopted a somewhat contrary view:
It should be within the discretion of the hospital board as to whether counsel may
attend the hearing and participate in the proceedings. Participation by counsel
would probably not be necessary unless the hospital's attorney is used in the pro-
ceedings or the extreme nature of the charges involved indicated that representa-
tion by an attorney would be advantageous.
Silver v. Castle Mem. Hosp., 497 P.2d 564, 571-72 (Hawaii), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048
(1972). The Supreme Court of California is in accord with the Silver view. See Anton v. San
Antonio Community Hosp., 140 Cal. Rptr. 442, 457 (1977). Insofar as the board's discretion
on this point is concerned, "[a]n abuse of discretion should be automatically found where
the physician was denied counsel but there was a hearing officer who was an attorney since
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cross-examine witnesses, 5 notice of hearing and of charges,"' and
possible conflicts or biases in the composition of the governing
board or medical staff tribunal which conducts a hearing on privi-
leges,9 7 among many others.98 One clear reason is that the process
such a denial is patently unfair." Cray, supra note 13, at 254.
The 1984 JCAH chapter on the Medical Staff states that the medical staff bylaws should
specify "the role, if any, of legal counsel." See MANUAL, supra note 66, at 99. The 1985
Medical Staff Standards, however, are silent on the role of the attorney. See Standards,
supra note 68, at 4.
95. Owing to the rule that administrative proceedings dealing with medical staff privi-
leges "need not be conducted as full blown trials," Christhilf v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp.
Ass'n, 496 F.2d 174, 179 (4th Cir. 1974), cross-examination therefore "need not be a part of
every hearing in order to satisfy due process." Woodbury v. McKinnon, 447 F.2d 839, 844
(5th Cir. 1971). "Whether [cross-examination] is required depends upon the circumstances."
Id. Thus, where the hospital board or the medical staff conducting the hearing has no sub-
poena power, "there can be no right to confront and cross-examine persons who have made
adverse statements of a doctor unless such persons testify at the hearing." Silver v. Castle
Mem. Hosp., 497 P.2d at 571. See Koelling v. Board of Trustees, 146 N.W.2d 284, 294 (Iowa
1966). Similarly, where there were no witnesses appearing at the hearing because, for in-
stance, it consisted of an "informal discussion by the medical staff" of the charges against
the physician, procedural due process is not offended. Woodbury, 447 F.2d at 844. See
Kaplan v. Carney, 404 F. Supp. 161, 164 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
96. Due process requires that the physician be notified that a hearing is available to him
and that such notice be timely to allow adequate defense preparation. Silver v. Castle Mem.
Hosp., 497 P.2d at 571. See Christhilf, 496 F.2d at 177-78.
With respect to notice of charges, written notice of specific reasons for denial of privileges,
including descriptions of a physician's recent activities, satisfies procedural due process re-
quirements. A physician may not require that notice of charges be so specific that it
amounts to the pleading of evidence; although more particularization might help the physi-
cian it is not constitutionally required. Truly v. Madison Gen. Hosp., 673 F.2d at 766. Thus,
where a physician was "charged in writing with lack of competence and judgment to per-
form surgery and surgical procedures," accompanied by a list of the names of specific cases
and the hospital records thereto, notice of charges was sufficient even though the physician's
request for separate allegations of the "exact nature of the fault in each case" was denied by
the hospital. Woodbury, 447 F.2d at 843-44. The courts have consistently eschewed any
requirement that the notice of charges be so exact and detailed so as to resemble, for in-
stance, a criminal indictment. Id. The question is simply whether the notice of charges suffi-
ciently affords the physician with an opportunity to answer and prepare an informed de-
fense. See Klinge v. Lutheran Charities Ass'n, 523 F.2d 56, 62 (8th Cir. 1975); Sosa, 437
F.2d at 176; Silver v. Castle Mem. Hosp., 497 P.2d at 571; Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 419 A.2d
1191, 1193-94 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
97. A fair hearing before an unbiased tribunal is essential to due process. Duffield v.
Charleston Area Medical Center, 503 F.2d 512, 517 (4th Cir. 1974). In our context this
means that a physician is "entitled to have his case judged by fair minded doctors who...
[are] able and willing to . . . decide the case with 'good faith objectivity.'" Klinge v. Lu-
theran Charities Ass'n, 523 F.2d 56, 63 (8th Cir. 1975). But the physician is not "entitled to
a panel made up of doctors who had never heard of the case and who knew nothing about
the facts of it or what they supposed the facts to be." Id. In Duffield, a physician challenged
as violative of due process the fact that certain members of the hospital's Joint Conference
Committee, which was the final arbiter of staff privileges decisions, had also sat on the Gov-
erning Board which rendered a decision adverse to the physician. The court ruled that this
fact alone did not necessarily indicate unfair bias, which "must stem from an extrajudicial
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which is due is a fluid and arguably evolving concept which is very
source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge
learned from his participation in the case." Duffield, 503 F.2d at 517. In support of this
holding, the United States Supreme Court has ruled, in a case involving suspension of a
physician's license by a state examining board, that it is not necessarily a violation of due
process for the same agency or body to perform both an investigative hearing and then
ultimately an adjudicative hearing. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47-52 (1975). Partici-
pants in a later hearing need not be disqualified "simply because they have been exposed to
evidence presented in non-adversary investigative procedures that were followed prior to the
adversary hearing." Klinge, 523 F.2d at 63. Hence, where a physician was a witness before a
medical hearing committee and was subsequently also a member of an appellate review
body passing upon a staff privileges recommendation, there was no automatic bias shown; in
fact, such illegal bias must be affirmatively shown by the aggrieved physician alleging it.
Ritter v. Board of Comm'rs, 637 P.2d 940, 946-47 (Wash. 1981). Similarly, in Ladenheim v.
Union County Hosp. Dist., 394 N.E.2d 770 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979), the fact that a physician-
member of the Credentials Committee assisted the hospital attorney in the preparation of
charges against an accused physician did not, absent a showing of unfair bias from an extra-
judicial source resulting in an opinion on the merits, infringe upon the charged physician's
due process rights. Id. at 774.
98. An example of one surprisingly recurring problem for hospitals is the disruptive phy-
sician. The Ninth Circuit described this problem well:
A hospital staff is highly interdependent, both in the sense that one doctor de-
pends upon the professional skill of other doctors and in the sense that the colle-
gial nature of the body makes tolerable working relationships an absolute prereq-
uisite to effective staff performance. The necessity for a healthy working
relationship is a function of the nature of the work to be done. Incompatible work-
ers on farms, ranches, or in certain types of factories can function reasonably well
although even there it is doubtful that full efficiency is achieved. Effective per-
formance by physicians on the staff of a hospital, whose tasks require a high de-
gree of cooperation, concentration, creativity, and the constant exercise of profes-
sional judgment, requires a greater degree of compatibility.
Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361, 368 (9th Cir. 1976). Numerous other
courts have allowed the hospital wide latitude in requiring that the physician not be a dis-
ruptive force. See, e.g., Truly v. Madison Gen. Hosp., 673 F.2d at 765 n.4 (upholding reason-
ableness of hospital's finding of doctor's "probable inability to work with administration and
staff"); Laje v. R.E. Thomason Gen. Hosp., 564 F.2d 1159, 1162 (5th Cir. 1977) (allowing
consideration of "ability to function smoothly in a hospital setting" as legitimate evaluation
criterion); Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 918 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (doctor's "alleged
inability to work harmoniously with his fellow surgeons, the residents and the support per-
sonnel could have had an impact on the hospital's effort to achieve its primary objective...
[of] outstanding patient care"); Schlein v. Milford Hosp., 423 F. Supp. 541, 544 (D. Conn.
1976) ("it is entirely consistent with due process for a hospital . . . to evaluate those per-
sonal qualities of a physician that reasonably relate to his ability to function effectively
within a hospital environment"); Ritter v. Board of Comm'rs, 637 P.2d 940, 948 (Wash.
1981) (bylaw requirement of "ability to cooperate and satisfactorily relate with others. . . is
. . . rationally related to the effective functioning of a hospital"); Ladenheim v. Union
County Hosp. Dist., 394 N.E.2d 770, 776 (Ill. Ct. App. 1979) (physician's "inability to work
with other members of the hospital staff was in itself sufficient grounds to deny him staff
privileges"); Theissen v. Watonga Mun. Hosp. Bd., 550 P.2d 938, 940 (Okla. 1976)
("problems in getting along with other members of the Staff" constitute sufficient basis to
deny staff privileges); Huffaker v. Bailey, 540 P.2d 1398, 1400 (Or. 1975) ("ability to work
smoothly with others is reasonably related to hospital's object of ensuring patient welfare").
But see Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center, 166 Cal. Rptr. 826, 837 (1980), where the
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much a creature of the particular circumstances of a given case. 9
Other than imposing broad notice and fair hearing standards, there
would be enormous difficulty and prolixity in conjuring up JCAH
standards adequate to cover all or even most of the potential spe-
cific issues that could arise once a court decides that some process
is due a physician. Moreover, such an excessive code would be im-
perious and would hardly comport with the goal of the JCAH to
set reasonable standards without requiring oppressive or even ri-
diculous uniformity among the various aspects of all hospitals. An-
other reason for the brevity and generality of JCAH medical staff
standards is an explicit desire on the part of the JCAH to accom-
modate various differences among the diffuse case law of different
jurisdictions. °00 For example, even among the minority of jurisdic-
tions which agree on the question of the quasi-public nature of the
modern private hospital, there remains significant dispute over the
scope of the physician's right to an attorney when his or her staff
privileges have been or are about to be adversely affected by the
hospital.10' But unmistakably, the JCAH standards on the medical
staff demand that the physician receive fair and unbiased treat-
ment at the hands of the accredited hospital, be it public or pri-
vate. Also, as noted previously, it purposefully avoids "technical
loopholes" in federal due process jurisprudence which, at least in
some jurisdictions, would limit the rejected physician to pursuing
other remedies, such as tortious conspiracy or antitrust.
Supreme Court of California took a much more restrictive view, and said that rejection of an
otherwise qualified physician from the medical staff was precluded
unless it can be shown that [a physician] manifests an inability to "work with
others" in the hospital setting which, by reason of its particular character,
presents a real and substantial danger that patients treated by him . . . might
receive other than a "high quality of medical care" if he were admitted to
membership.
99. In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), Justice Powell, writing for the majority,
set out the three factors which must be considered in deciding what particular elements of
process are due:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural require-
ment would entail.
Id. at 335.
100. Telephone interview with Dr. Becker of the JCAH Staff on Standards (Mar. 11,
1984).
101. See supra note 94.
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IV. THE RESPONSE OF FLORIDA COURTS TO STATUTORY
IMPOSITION OF JCAH STANDARDS
The previous discussion impels the conclusion that the statutory
imposition of JCAH standards upon all Florida hospitals was
clearly intended to overrule the judicially created rule of absolute
discretion of the private hospital to grant, deny, or withdraw staff
privileges at will. Accordingly, we may now evaluate whether Flor-
ida courts have understood the meaning of this statutory mandate.
The Second District Court of Appeal, in Moles v. White,102 ad-
dressed the issue of the public-private dichotomy over one year af-
ter the passage and effective date of section 395.065, compelling
JCAH procedural standards.10 3 In Moles, two physicians who were
specialists in open heart surgery applied for medical staff privileges
at the Morton F. Plant Hospital, a private institution which was
"the only facility in the Clearwater area authorized to provide
open heart surgery and supportive services."" 4 Both applicants
were rejected, and at least one of them was rejected summarily
"without referral of the application to the Credentials Committee
for qualification, or to the medical staff . . . for a recommenda-
tion. ' 1 0 5 Upon rejection, the physicians sued the hospital, its cor-
porate owner and manager, the hospital's executive director, and
three members of its medical staff alleging "violation of state anti-
trust provisions, denial of due process, restraint of trade or com-
merce, and breach of a fiduciary trust and public purpose. "106
After dismissing their antitrust claims as not within the province
of the then current Florida antitrust statutes, the Second District
also dismissed the physicians' due process claims, relying on the
Florida Supreme Court decision in West Coast Hospital Associa-
tion v. Hoare,10 1 which, it will be recalled, affirmed the immunity
of private hospitals "from adhering to the universally recognized
requirements of due process."' 0 8 The Moles court quoted that por-
tion of the Hoare decision where the Florida Supreme Court con-
ceded that the Florida legislature would probably have "the power
and authority to regulate private hospitals" but also noted that it
102. 336 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).
103. See FLA. STAT. § 395.065(1) (1975) (repealed 1982).
104. Moles, 336 So. 2d at 429.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 64 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1953). See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
108. Moles, 336 So. 2d at 429.
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"has not attempted to do so."' 0 9 The Second District then re-
marked, purporting to bring the Hoare decision up to date, that
"[o]ur hospital licensing laws have not been substantially changed
since before the Hoare case," 110 when, at least insofar as medical
staff privileges were concerned, nothing could have been further
from the truth.
It is not apparent whether the physician-appellants in Moles
were aware of section 395.065 and what it could have meant for
them by providing a cause of action to require due process-like
treatment."' It is, of course, fairly arguable that the Moles court
ought not be criticized too harshly for its decision, since, with few
exceptions (e.g., jurisdiction), an appellate court is under no duty
sua sponte to search out the law favorable to one side or the other,
but only to consider those arguments raised before it, and it does
not appear that the physicians even brought up the issue of section
395.065. But still, the Second District's loose declaration that Flor-
ida's hospital licensing laws, particularly those dealing with the
medical staff, have not changed since before 1953 is a grossly incor-
rect statement which the court should have refrained from making
without sufficient knowledge of its certainty.
The Second District repeated its grievous error in Margolin v.
Morton F. Plant Hospital Association,"' a case coincidentally in-
volving the same private hospital involved in Moles. 3 In Margo-
lin, a physician who was removed from the staff of the hospital
sought injunctive relief on the theory that he had been denied pro-
cedural due process. The Second District in a per curiam response
cited its previous opinion in Moles, along with Hoare, in noting
that the hospital was private. 4 However, because Dr. Margolin
also alleged in his complaint that the hospital had substantially
departed from its bylaws, the Second District followed the estab-
lished rule that even private hospitals must follow their own by-
laws, such that if the staff bylaws of a private hospital provide due
process-like treatment for its medical staff, these provisions must
be followed by the hospital. 5
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. The Moles court dismissed the other contentions of the physicians having to do
with their restraint of trade and quasi-public arguments. Id. at 429-31.
112. 348 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
113. Indeed, the private hospital involved in both the Moles and Margolin decisions was,
incredibly, the same hospital involved over a generation earlier in the Hoare opinion.
114. Margolin, 348 So. 2d at 57.
115. See supra note 15.
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The most recent Second District opinion concerning medical
staff privileges in the context of a private hospital was Hackett v.
Metropolitan General Hospital,116 a case in which Dr. Hackett, a
urologist, was denied admission to the all-osteopathic medical staff
of a private hospital because of an alleged conspiracy between the
hospital, through its board of trustees, and the osteopathic physi-
cians on its medical staff to monopolize urology practice in favor of
the one staff member practicing urology and to exclude medical
doctors from the staff for fear of their competition with osteo-
paths. 1 7 Specifically, Dr. Hackett sued under Florida's Antitrust
Act of 1980118 and under the Florida law which prohibits discrimi-
nation against various medical disciplines.119 The Second District
ruled that Florida's antitrust laws, which had been amended since
the Moles decision, clearly encompassed restraints upon the prac-
tice of medicine, and that Dr. Hackett's complaint was adequate to
allege a violation of section 395.0653(1), the prohibition of discrim-
ination against professional medical disciplines. But the Hackett
court clearly preserved the validity of the Hoare rule which, in its
words, allows private hospitals "the right to exclude a physician
. ..for any reason, ' 120 and thus the Second District still seemed
unaware that the public-private dichotomy had been legislated out
116. 422 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
117. Id. at 987.
118. FLA. STAT. ch. 542 (1981).
119. FLA. STAT. § 395.0653 (1981). This section was originally enacted in 1979 to abro-
gate prior holdings which allowed even public hospitals to discriminate against osteopaths,
podiatrists, or dentists in staff privileges decisions merely on the basis of prejudice against
these professions per se. See Richardson v. City of Miami, 198 So. 51 (Fla. 1940); Taylor v.
Horn, 189 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966).
Section 395.0653, as amended up to 1981, prohibited any hospital from refusing to grant
staff or clinical privileges "solely because" the applicant was licensed as an osteopath, den-
tist, or a podiatrist. FLA. STAT. § 395.0653(1) (1981). Moreover, hospitals were required to
consider each applicant, whether medical doctor or podiatrist, for instance, "on an individ-
ual basis pursuant to critetia applied equally to all other disciplines." Id. § 395.0653(2). The
term "disciplines" refers to "different fields of licensure rather than the narrower classifica-
tions within one of the disciplines." Sarasota County Pub. Hosp. Bd. v. Shahawy, 408 So. 2d
644, 646 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). Thus, requiring a medical doctor who is not board certified by
the American Board of Cardiovascular Diseases to demonstrate the higher standard of being
"unusually qualified" because of the applicant's lack of certification is not discriminatory
within the meaning of this statute because board certification refers to a classification
within the discipline of doctor of medicine. Id.
These prohibitions against professional discrimination were carried over by the 1982 Flor-
ida legislative session into the new statute, FLA. STAT. § 395.011 (1983). This new section
expanded the protection given to professional disciplines in several respects, which shall be
discussed above in the text.
120. Hackett, 422 So. 2d at 988.
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of existence for over seven years at the time of its decision. 2
The apparently oblique message of section 395.065 was not lost
upon the Fourth District Court of Appeal, however, which deliv-
ered a highly commendable opinion in Carida v. Holy Cross Hospi-
tal, Inc."' Dr. Carida was a member of the medical staff of Holy
Cross Hospital, a private institution, who was refused reappoint-
ment to the medical staff. The trial court dismissed his complaint
against the hospital for compensatory and punitive damages on the
authority of the Hoare decision, notwithstanding the trial court's
''apparent conclusion" that the denial of his reappointment was
occasioned by malice and effectuated through severe procedural
irregularities."'
The Carida court correctly ruled that section 395.065 "did away
with the public versus private hospital distinction in denying or
restricting medical staff privileges," and accordingly the court re-
versed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint." 4 In support of
this ruling, the Fourth District quoted a portion of the then cur-
rent JCAH standards on the medical staff which then, as now,
were "predicated on fairness of hearing and appellate review mech-
anisms. ' 25 The Carida court also noted that Florida Administra-
tive Code Rule 1OD-28.58(2)(d), promulgated by HRS in 1977,
"imposed upon all hospitals the requirements of a hearing and
thorough investigation of applications for appointment and reap-
pointment to medical staffs."' 21
121. The Third District Court of Appeal demonstrated its awareness of § 395.065 in
Buckner v. Lower Fla. Keys Hosp. Dist., 403 So. 2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). But the
Buckner case involved a physician's suit against a public hospital, and therefore the issue of
the intended effects of § 395.065 upon the public-private dichotomy did not arise.
122. 427 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
123. Id. at 805. The procedural irregularities stemmed from the hospital's blatant failure
to follow its own bylaws as well as from certain alleged due process violations in the form of
insufficient notice and denial of cross-examination.
124. Id.
125. Id. (footnote omitted).
126. Id. at 806 (footnote omitted). HRS, as the statutorily designated "licensing agency"
for ch. 395, Florida Statutes, titled "Hospital Licensing and Regulation," FLA. STAT. §
395.01(4) (1977), promulgated FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 1OD-28.58(2)(d) pursuant to its
rulemaking authority accorded by FLA. STAT. § 395.07 (1977). The rule requires:
Review of all applications for appointment and annual reappointment to all cate-
gories of the medical staff, and recommendations on each to the hospital's gov-
erning authority, including delineation of privileges to be granted in each case,
and right of hearing and appeal. Recommendation to the governing body for with-
drawal of any privileges of a member of the medical staff or dismissal from the
medical staff will be made only after a thorough investigation by the medical staff
or a committee thereof, with the subject member being given the right of hearing
before the medical staff or a committee thereof.
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Having finally extinguished the public versus private medical
staff distinction in Florida nearly a decade after section 395.065
was passed by the Florida legislature, the Fourth District con-
fronted the problem of that section's grant of limited immunity,
which states:
There shall be no liability on the part of, and no cause of action
of any nature shall arise against, any hospital, hospital medical
staff, or hospital disciplinary body or its agents or employees for
any action taken in good faith and without malice in carrying out
the provision of this section.12 7
Despite this section's seemingly all encompassing language, the
Carida court construed "liability" to mean "responsibility for dam-
ages proximately resulting from a tort" and interpreted the phrase
" 'cause of action of any nature,' as referring to and limited by the
word 'liability.' "28 Because the section requires an allegation of
malice to initially overcome the immunity, the court recognized
that to construe the section "as completely eliminating any cause
of action of any nature against a hospital which gave such inade-
quate notice of the reasons reappointment was not being recom-
mended," but which did not act maliciously in so doing, would
bear the anomalous result that any nonmalicious action taken by a
hospital adverse to the privileges of one of its staff, no matter how
arbitrary, capricious or even absurd, "would go totally unan-
swered." 29 Such an interpretation was viewed by the court as
anathema to Florida's constitutional guarantee of access to the
state's courts for redress of injury. 30 Thus, the Carida court con-
cluded that section 395.065, along with Rule 1OD-28.58(2)(d), al-
lows a physician to sue in a Florida circuit court to compel a due
process-like review of the hospital's decision regarding staff privi-
leges. If in such a suit the physician does not seek pecuniary dam-
ages, but merely due process-like review, malice need not be al-
leged or established. If, on the other hand, the physician desires, in
addition to the due process-like review, compensatory or punitive
damages, malice must be alleged and ultimately proved. Presuma-
bly, a physician-claimant seeking injunctive relief to compel the
private hospital to comply with its own medical staff bylaws with-
127. FLA. STAT. § 395.065(2) (1975).
128. Carida, 427 So. 2d at 806 n.6.
129. Id.
130. Id. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
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out an attendant prayer for money damages need not allege
malice."'
In 1982, the Florida legislature renewed its commitment to its
statutory imposition of JCAH procedural protections by extending
the "sunset" expiration132 date of the current version of section
395.065 until 1992. This renewed version of the statute appears in
section 395.0115133 with only minor changes in the language of sec-
tion 395.065. An additional provision, however, was added in the
1982 legislation. 1 3  The new provision exempts the "proceedings
and records of committees and governing bodies" of public hospi-
tals from exposure to Florida's open-government, or "sunshine,"
laws. 1 35 By, in effect, equating the confidentiality of a public hospi-
tal's proceedings and records pertaining to staff privileges delibera-
tions with the secrecy of the private hospital, section 395.0115 goes
even further than its predecessor in abrogating the public-private
hospital dichotomy in Florida.
One problem which seemed to remain after Carida was the scope
of the statutorily mandated JCAH protections. Both section
395.065 and its current version, section 395.0115, require "good
cause" limitations on adverse action taken by the hospital against
the privileges of "any staff member," but what about the staff ap-
131. Cf. Palm Beach-Martin County Medical Center v. Panaro, 431 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1983) (court recognized the right of injunctive relief against a private hospital to com-
pel compliance with its own bylaws, citing Carida, with no mention of necessity of pleading
malice).
132. See FLA. STAT. §§ 11.61, 395.0115 n.1 (1983).
133. FLA. STAT. § 395.0115 (1983).
134. FLA. STAT. § 395.0115(3) (1983) states:
The proceedings and records of committees and governing bodies which relate
solely to actions taken in carrying out the provisions of this section shall not
under any circumstances be subject to inspection under the provisions of chapter
119; nor shall meetings held pursuant to achieving the objectives of such commit-
tees and governing bodies be open to the public under the provisions of chapter
286.
135. See FLA. STAT. chs. 119, 286 (1983). FLA. STAT. § 395.0115(3) (1983) will have a
preemptive effect on future decisions which might otherwise have followed the lead of Gadd
v. News-Press Pub. Co., 412 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). The Gadd ruling allowed a
newspaper to have access to the personnel files of present and past physicians at a public
hospital, as well as access to the minutes and other documents relating to the activities of
the hospital's utilization review committee of the medical staff, all pursuant to ch. 119, Flor-
ida Statutes. The Second District rejected the hospital's argument that the statutory impo-
sition of JCAH standards forbade such access because those standards require confidential-
ity. The Second District, which as we have seen has been impervious to the message of §
395.065, concluded: "Simply requiring compliance with the standards of the JCAH, in our
opinion, does not create an exemption or confidentiality 'provided by law.'" Gadd, 412 So.
2d at 896 (emphasis in original).
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plicant? Carida involved the termination of a staff member's privi-
leges only, rather than the potential staff privileges of an initial
applicant. This apparent gap is easily closed, however, for two rea-
sons. First, both the current and former versions of the statute
evince a clear legislative intent of complete and unadulterated in-
corporation of JCAH procedural standards on the medical staff,
which, as previously indicated, include procedural protections for
the initial applicant. In this regard we might also note, by way of
resort to the protean principles of statutory construction, that the
term "deny," as distinguished from the terms "suspend," "revoke,"
or "curtail," is understood to mean either a denial of staff appoint-
ment to an initial applicant or a denial of reappointment to a phy-
sician whose term of staff membership has expired. 136 Second, and
more convincingly, the licensing agency charged with the interpre-
tation and enforcement of chapter 395-HRS-has through its in-
terpretation of this statute promulgated Rule 1OD-28.58(2)(d) 131
which, as the Carida court noted, requires a "hearing and thorough
investigation of applications" for either initial appointment or re-
appointment to the medical staff."3 8
These two reasons should foreclose the question of whether the
applicant for initial appointment was intended to be included in
the statutory incorporation of JCAH procedural protections. But
even if these arguments concerning the scope of section 395.0115
are considered unpersuasive by a Florida court, the question is still
indubitably settled by virtue of new procedural protections for ini-
tial physician-applicants to the medical staff which were enacted
by the Florida legislature in 1982. These protections were ap-
pended onto existing statutory provisions prohibiting professional
discrimination against osteopaths, dentists, and podiatrists. 139 Ac-
cording to the 1982 amendments, the governing board of the hospi-
tal must now "set standards and procedures to be applied by the
licensed facility and its medical staff in considering and acting
upon applications for staff membership or professional clinical
privileges.' 0 And, "[tihese standards and procedures shall be
available for public inspection.""' The standards or professional
criteria which are set pursuant to this requirement must clearly be
136. See Cray, supra note 13, at 236-38; McCall, supra note 13, passim.
137. See supra note 126.
138. Carida, 427 So. 2d at 806.
139. See supra note 119.
140. FLA. STAT. § 395.011(4) (1983).
141. Id.
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reasonably related to the primary hospital goal of providing high
quality patient care:
The applicant's eligibility for staff membership or professional
clinical privileges shall be determined by the applicant's back-
ground, experience, health, training, and demonstrated compe-
tency; the applicant's adherence to applicable professional ethics;
the applicant's reputation; and the applicant's ability to work
with others and by such other elements as may be determined by
the governing board, consistent with this part. 4"
Finally, the hospital is now required to submit in writing its rea-
sons for rejection of a medical staff applicant to the "applicant's
respective licensing board,"" s in addition to providing these rea-
sons for denial to the applicant within thirty days and upon writ-
ten request."'
Thus, any doubt which might have arisen following Carida, as to
whether the rejected applicant for staff privileges was required to
be accorded certain due process-like protections similar to those
required for staff members, has been quite commendably resolved
by these 1982 amendments.
V. STATUTORY IMPOSITION OF PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS FOR
PHYSICIANS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Florida is not unique in requiring its hospitals to comply with
JCAH procedural standards in dealings with the medical staff.
142. Id. § 395.011(3).
143. Id. § 395.011(5). The requirement that the hospital report its reasons for denial to
the applicant's licensing board seems to dovetail with the separate statutory requirement
that hospitals must report the "suspension or any other disciplinary action" taken by the
hospital, its medical staff, or peer review group against a member of the medical staff. See
id. § 458.337.
With respect to the earlier discussion in note 91 (concerning the fact that a mere rejection
by a public hospital of an initial applicant for staff privileges, without more, did not infringe
upon the applicant's liberty interest to pursue his or her chosen occupation), it was empha-
sized that, absent some sort of charge, the applicant's license to practice medicine was unaf-
fected by the rejection of any given hospital. But the requirement of § 395.011(5) that the
reasons for denial must be submitted to the applicant's licensing board would seem to di-
rectly affect the status of his or her license. Hence, it would also infringe upon a protected
liberty interest such that if a mere rejection by a public hospital in Florida, notwithstanding
the statutory due process-like protections now in place, did not previously implicate proce-
dural due process because the requisite infringement upon the applicant's liberty interest
was lacking, it now seems almost certain that a mere rejection in Florida of such an applica-
tion implicates a protected liberty interest per se.
144. Id. § 395.011(5).
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Rhode Island has a substantially similar law which requires the
governing board of any licensed hospital (hence including both
public and private hospitals) to comply with JCAH procedural
standards when it seeks to "suspend, deny, revoke, or curtail" the
privilege of any staff members.1 5 Presumably Rhode Island's stat-
utory requirement of JCAH procedural standards served to abolish
a public-private hospital dichotomy in that state, thus resolving an
issue which the Supreme Court of Rhode Island had previously left
unsettled."
6
The California courts, as previously discussed, adopted a com-
mon law "quasi-public" theory of the modern private hospital,
thus according physicians at private hospitals the same procedural
protections available to those staff physicians at public hospi-
tals.'47 The issue then arose whether a physician could attack an
adverse privileges decision of a private hospital through the same
procedural means employed by public hospital physicians. More
specifically, the question was whether section 1094.5 of California's
Code of Civil Procedure, a provision which established a special-
ized review by mandate of certain types of administrative decisions
and which appeared to apply only to administrative decisions by
governmental agencies, was applicable to challenges lodged by pri-
vate hospital physicians. The Supreme Court of California, in An-
ton v. San Antonio Community Hospital,'" concluded: "It would
be incongruous . . to hold that the decisions of private hospital
boards, which are required. . . to be based upon a hearing of sub-
stantially identical scope and purport, were to be subject to some
different form of review." 149 Of several reasons offered in support
145. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-23 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
146. Hagan v. Osteopathic Gen. Hosp., 232 A.2d 596, 600 (R.I. 1967).
147. See supra notes 28 & 31 and accompanying text.
148. 140 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1977).
149. Id. at 450 (emphasis in original). The situation in Florida at this juncture is very
similar to the one which was addressed in Anton. That is,-to the extent that even though
the public-private dichotomy has been abolished where the right to procedural protections
is concerned, there are still two distinct methods of challenging a hospital's adverse privi-
leges decision, depending upon whether it is a private or public institution. Since public
hospitals are not considered administrative agencies within the meaning of Florida's Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, see FLA. STAT. § 120.52 (1983) and Siddeeq v. Tallahassee Mem.
Hosp., 364 So. 2d 99, 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), the quasi-judicial decisions of their governing
boards affecting one's staff privileges are usually challenged in the state courts by means of
a common law writ of certiorari in the circuit court. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(c). The circuit
court's scope of certiorari review is to determine whether the hospital's governing board
departed from the essential requirements of law and whether its decision was supported by
competent substantial evidence. De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912, 915-16 (Fla. 1957);
McCray v. County of Volusia, 400 So. 2d 511, 512 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). The decision of the
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of this conclusion, the Anton court took emphatic judicial notice of
JCAH procedural standards on the medical staff and of the fact
that hospitals covered by the Local Hospital District Law in Cali-
fornia were expressly subjected to these standards by statute, not
unlike the situation in Florida.150 In this regard, the court noted
that "the practical necessity of securing JCAH accreditation has
the effect of insuring that substantially all hospitals in this state,
whether public or private, have bylaws governing hearing and ap-
pellate procedures which are designed to comply with JCAH stan-
dards. . . . ,,151 Thus, "the use of the same judicial procedure for
reviewing the adjudicatory decisions of all such hospitals" was
deemed by the Anton court to be "peculiarly appropriate.
' 52
In 1972, the New York legislature enacted a statutory scheme
which, among other things, made it an "improper practice for the
governing body of a hospital" to deny staff membership or to "cur-
tail, terminate or diminish in any way" the professional privileges
of a physician, dentist, or podiatrist "without stating the reasons
therefor, or if the reasons stated are unrelated to standards of pa-
tient care, patient welfare, the objective of the institution or the
character or competency of the applicant."153 The scheme allows
an aggrieved physician to file a complaint with the New York Pub-
lic Health Council, which in turn is required to make a "prompt
investigation" of the hospital's decision.1 54 If the Council then de-
termines that "cause exists for crediting the allegations of the com-
plaint," it must notify the governing body of the hospital which
rendered the decision and direct it to review its decision. 55
circuit court reviewing the quasi-judicial decision of the governing board is in turn review-
able by the district court of appeal also through a writ of certiorari, and not by way of
appeal. City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So. 2d 624, 626 (Fla. 1982); FLA. R. APp. P.
9.030(b)(2)(B).
Because both the Carida decisions and the 1982 statutory amendments affecting physi-
cian-applicants to the medical staff are so recent, the procedural methods for review of a
decision of the governing board of a private hospital with respect to staff privileges are still
uncertain. Presumably such review will be by way of a suit for injunctive relief and/or
damages filed within the original jurisdiction of the circuit court and not by means of the
discretionary writ of certiorari. It is of course possible, however, that the Florida Rules of
Appellate Procedure regarding common law writs of certiorari could be construed as cover-
ing the quasi-judicial decisions of private hospital governing boards, similar to the conclu-
sion reached on the same issue in Anton.
150. Anton, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 451.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 452.
153. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2801-b(1) (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1983).
154. Id. § 2801-b(2) to (3).
155. Id.
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In Fritz v. Huntington Hospital, s15  New York's high state court
interpreted these provisions to mean that New York's previous
common law rule15 7 allowing private hospitals sole discretion to ex-
clude physicians from their staffs for any reason was "effectively
limited.' 5  The Fritz decision involved two osteopathic physicians
who were both licensed by the State of New York and who had
both completed accredited internships. The two applied for staff
privileges at a New York private hospital, but were denied admis-
sion to the medical staff because neither had completed an intern-
ship or residency program approved by the American Medical As-
sociation (AMA). Upon their rejection they filed a complaint with
the New York Public Health Council, and the Council found that
the standards of accredited osteopathic institutions were compara-
ble to those institutional training programs approved by the
AMA. 59 The Council therefore concluded that the hospital's ad-
verse decisions regarding the two applicants were not reasonably
related to the goal of high quality patient care. But following the
Council's conclusion and order of remand and review, the private
hospital again adhered to its decision.'60 It was at that point that
the Fritz court ruled that the physicians had standing to challenge
the hospital decision in state court, because the Council's authority
to do anything in the matter had ended.'' On the merits, the court
ruled that the hospital had not shouldered its burden of rebutting
the Public Health Council's findings, which were presumptively
156. 384 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1976).
157. See, e.g., Leider v. Beth Israel Hosp. Ass'n, 227 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1962); Van Campen
v. Olean Gen. Hosp., 147 N.E. 219 (N.Y. 1925). In an unusual case the common law barrier
could be set aside where both the economic necessity of the privileges to the physician and
the monopoly power of the hospital were demonstrated. See Salter v. New York State Psy-
chological Ass'n, 248 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1964); Moss v. Albany Medical Center Hosp., 403
N.Y.S.2d 568 (App. Div. 1978).
158. Fritz, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 96.
159. Id. at 95.
160. Id.
161. In a subsequent case, the New York Court of Appeals refined its view of the proce-
dural requirements of § 2801-b. If, upon remand from the Public Health Council, the hospi-
tal still maintains its adverse position regarding the applicant's request for staff privileges,
the next step for the physician is to file an action pursuant to N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §
2801-c (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1983) "to enjoin the hospital from discriminating against
or unjustly denying professional privileges or staff membership in violation of section 2801-b
of the Public Health Law." Cohoes Mem. Hosp. v. Department of Health, 424 N.Y.S.2d 110,
113 (1979). In the injunction action, the lower court reviews the privileges controversy de
novo in a hearing in which the findings of the Public Health Council are admissible "only to
the extent that [they serve] as prima facie evidence of any fact or facts found therein." Id.
at 113. It is only at this point that the § 2801-c hearing decision is subject to appellate
review at the request of either the hospital or the physician. Id.
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correct, by demonstrating that AMA approved residencies or in-
ternships were superior to their accredited osteopathics counter-
parts.162 The Fritz court concluded:
By this determination we do not mean to indicate that hospitals
are no longer free to be selective or that they must accept individ-
uals licensed to practice medicine, regardless of competency,
character or institutional objectives. However, judicial interven-
tion is warranted where, as here, privileges are denied without
proper foundation and without proper reason, and no challenge is
made as to the actual medical credentials and capabilities of the
applicants .
VI. CONCLUSION
By virtue of statutory mandate, Florida has joined those states
which, through judicial decision or by positive law, require that
members or applicants to the private hospital medical staff receive
substantially the same procedural protections accorded the public
hospital staff member or applicant. In fact, the required protec-
tions for the initial applicant to a private hospital significantly ex-
ceed the scope of federal due process protection available to an
initial applicant to the public hospital, since, as we have seen, the
initial applicant seldom has a protected liberty or property interest
at stake. The public-private dichotomy in Florida, as elsewhere,
amounted to little more than an absurd legal fiction, and it is
hoped that Florida courts will interpret the new provisions of Flor-
ida law affecting physicians and hospitals correctly, as the Carida
court has done.
162. Fritz, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 98.
163. Id. at 98-99.
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